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UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S ASPIRATIONAL CONSTITUTION AS SCAFFOLDING
I.	THE LAY OF THE LAND

Quite a large number of contributors to the literature on comparative
constitutionalism have noted that over the past twenty years, many new one-partydominant constitutional democracies have suffered from similar problems of
clientelism, cronyism, and corruption.1 This troika invariably stunts both development 2
and growth. 3 The political-legal science literature thus provides an eminently
reasonable (if partial) explanation for the many false starts experienced by postauthoritarian, one-party-dominant constitutional democracies.
The finest contributions to this discourse remind us that when we undertake
such analysis, we must have (a) a firm handle on a particular country’s extant legal
doctrine (few systems arise ex nihilo); (b) a nuanced appreciation for the political,
social, and economic environment in which a new constitutional order is situated (all
substructures are not alike); and (c) the ability to recognize that established
democratic republics suffer similar ills.4
On the other side of the South African constitutional jurisprudential literature
are, for lack of a better locution, the transformative constitutionalists.5 The tendency
here is to assume that an aspirational document can magically pull a bunny out of a
hat. The bunny? A radically transformed society in which all members have both (a)
the ability to appear in public without shame; and (b) those necessities of existence
deemed necessary by all citizens to pursue a life worth valuing. A Constitutional
Court that handles some thirty-five cases a year can neither alter dramatically the
economic and social substructures of a highly stratified polity nor contribute
1.

See Sujit Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy, 2 Const. Ct. Rev. 1, 7–8, 22–24, 32–33 (2009); see also Heinz
Klug, Finding the Constitutional Court’s Place in South Africa’s Democracy: The Interaction of Principle and
Institutional Pragmatism in the Court’s Decision Making, 3 Const. Ct. Rev. 1, 2–4 (2010).

2.

On how deeply entrenched, and substantively unfair, cultural, social, economic, and political practices
undermine the ability of individuals, and disadvantaged groups, to pursue lives worth valuing, see
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (2000).

3.

See Goldman Sachs, Two Decades of Freedom: What South Africa is Doing With it, and
What Now Needs to be Done (2013); World Bank Group [WBG], South Africa Economic
Update: Focus on Inequality of Opportunity 15–39 (2012).

4.

Theunis Roux’s work best reflects this orientation. See Theunis Roux, The South African Constitutional
Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 33, 33–38, 48–54 (2014). See generally Heinz
Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction
(2000); Theunis Roux, The Politics of Principle: The First South African Constitutional
Court, 1995–2005 (2013). When comparative law scholars cherry pick, they generally lose sight of the
country-specific dynamics that give rise to what appear to be similar judicial doctrines. On the evils of
cherry-picking, see John Bell, Comparing Public Law, in Comparative Law in the 21st Century 235,
236–48 (Andrew Harding & Esin Örücü eds., 2002); Günter Frankenburg, Critical Comparisons:
Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 411, 414–26 (1985).

5.

See Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 SAJHR 146, 150 (1998).
Klare’s essay is the urtext for transformative constitutionalists. Transformative constitutionalism
captures “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement [by the
judiciary].” Id.
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substantially to the creation of a functional democracy unless three basic requirements
for a just social order are already largely in place.6
A constitution—that contains innovatively designed institutions and a justiciable
Bill of Rights—can assist a nation in starting over. However, no matter how lovely a
new constitution (or “basic law”)7 may look in print, it cannot provide (a) a rule of law
culture reciprocally related to a robust civil society, (b) political accountability through
regular elections that allow citizens to kick the bums out and break up patronage
arrangements, or (c) effective bureaucracies that deliver basic services and coordinate
daily life. Only once these three basic requirements are in place can a constitutional
democracy realize the increasingly egalitarian economic and social arrangements
needed to bring about genuine liberation.8 That seems rather obvious. Yet the
dazzling array of promises made in South Africa’s Constitution can, understandably,
distort one’s perception of what a new constitution in a post-authoritarian, putatively
multi-party, democracy can do.
This essay begins where my last book, The Selfless Constitution, left off.9 That
book’s coda—“The Crooked Timber of Democracy”—served as a reminder of what
we could or could not expect from this new constitutional order within a span of a
mere twenty years.
Let’s start with the primary purpose of constitutions. We forget that these
documents begin as peace treaties of quite a unique kind: (a) highbrowed, often
detailed, social contracts; and (b) bargains, hard struck, after military engagement,
civil strife, or long, drawn out deliberations. As bargains, these efforts and outcomes
tend to produce conservative documents. No one gets everything that they desire. As
a result, a substantial portion of the status quo is preserved. That’s not always so bad.
Most of that which gives meaning to our lives lies elsewhere, not in political
demonstrations or rights-based constitutional litigation, but in the daily exchanges
that pre-exist constitutional orders. If new constitutional orders do anything well,
then they improve those daily exchanges. Despite the fact that life in South Africa
still bears a remarkable resemblance to life on the plantation, this nation’s velvet
revolution has not left the country where it began twenty years ago. The enhanced
equality and dignity many South Africans enjoy today is a function of dramatic
changes made to and through their basic law.
6.

See generally Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial
Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (2014); Henry Kissinger, World Order (2014).

7.

Basic law is another term used to refer to a constitution. Constitution Definition, Duhaime’s Law
Dictionary, http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Constitution.aspx (last visited Apr. 9,
2016). Germany refers to its Constitution as the basic law. The Basic Law, Germany.info, http://www.
germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/06__Foreign__Policy__State/04__Political__System/02__Basic__
Law/__Basic__Law.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).

8.

See Sanele Sibanda, Not Purpose-Made! Transformative Constitutionalism, Post-Independence
Constitutionalism and the Struggle to Eradicate Poverty, 22 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 482, 485–94 (2011);
see also Sanele Sibanda, Not Quite a Rejoinder: Some Thoughts and Reflections on Michelman’s “Liberal
Constitutionalism, Property Rights and the Assault on Property”, 24 Stellenbosch L. Rev 329 (2013).

9.

Stu Woolman, The Selfless Constitution: Experimentalism and Flourishing as
Foundations of South Africa’s Basic Law (2013).
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Political elites are held partially accountable. That limited political accountability
occurs largely within African National Congress (ANC) party structures that feel
some pressure from courts, Chapter 9 institutions, small oppositional parties, the
media, international non-governmental organizations, 11,000 largely peaceful
protests recorded per annum,10 and a growing student movement currently roiling
the country.11 That ain’t nothing. After twenty years of such indirect political
pressure, the state now delivers electricity to 84.7 per cent of the population, provides
social welfare grants to 16.6 million of 51.8 million inhabitants (a jump from 5.9 per
cent in 1996 to 32 per cent in 2014),12 and has created over three million new housing
units13 while increasing the national budget allocation for housing by 10.3 per cent.14
Of course, here the hands go up: “That’s not the South Africa with which we
should be content.” That’s true. However, we must admit that South Africa has yet
to arrive at its first staging post, let alone its last. That proposition will remain true for
quite some time.
How best then to understand the South African Constitution (or any other
constitution)? The Constitution is a form of scaffolding. No recipe yet exists for an
immortal republic. But if a constitutional democracy wishes to last more than a few
decades, several pre-conditions must obtain. First, the rule of law in its most basic
form: not only must governors and governed be subject to the same rules, but the
citizens themselves also ought to be subject to the same rules vis-à-vis one another.
Second, a constitutional democracy ought to ensure political accountability. The ability
to “kick the bums out” now and again may or may not lead to better policies or
outcomes in the short term, but it does help to prevent Tammany Hall patronage
systems from taking root. Moreover, political accountability operates as the best
guarantor that public servants will serve the public irrespective of who holds power
at any given moment. Third, a functional constitutional democracy requires the
provision of basic goods and essential infrastructure by a competent, depoliticized civil
service. A country needs properly trained security services, an adequate system of
public education, decent roads and ports for personal and commercial transport,
proper document control, and an effective system of taxation by a state revenue
service. In the absence of such public goods, things will either fall apart or muddle
along to everyone’s dissatisfaction. Fourth, a truly civil, civil society—married to an
entrenched rule of law culture—means that the expectation of procedural fairness
from the state and its public servants is inextricably linked to the development of a
10.

See Have Protests in South Africa Nearly Doubled Since 2010?, Afr. Check (July 22, 2015), https://
africacheck.org/reports/have-protests-in-south-africa-nearly-doubled-since-2010/.

11.

See Ryan Lenora Brown, The Student Protests Rocking South Africa are About More Than Tuition, Foreign
Policy (Oct. 30, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/30/the-student-protests-rocking-southafrica-are-about-more-than-tuition/.

12.

Goldman Sachs, supra note 3, at 4.

13.

See Saskia Greyling & Sophie Oldfield, Housing Waiting Game, IOL News (Sept. 11, 2015), http://
www.iol.co.za/dailynews/opinion/housing-waiting-game-1914515.

14.

Goldman Sachs, supra note 3, at 28.
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civil society in which individuals and groups treat other individuals and groups with
dignity and mutual respect.15 The reciprocal relationship between the rule of law and
a robust civil society cannot be ignored.16 However, this reciprocal relationship is
particularly difficult to realize in an inegalitarian polity with severely limited
amounts of mutual trust, loyalty, friendship, kinship, and cooperation.
Why has South Africa not done better in terms of the realization of its
imagination? It looks like a classic problem of collective action.17 First, the large stores of
social capital required to foment relatively radical change to apartheid-era economic,
cultural, and legal structures do not yet exist.18 Second, the inability to form new
bridging networks and bonding networks prevents the creation of new parties and
social institutions that would challenge the still dominant parties and groups that
brokered the Constitution.19 Both problems, however, are fundamentally political.
Little can be done through the tenets of the basic law, and, in particular, the Bill of
Rights, to alter the current, unstable, unsustainable terrain. 20
15.

See President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para. 41 (“[T]he purpose of our new
constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be
accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership [in] particular groups.”).

16.

See Stu Woolman, On the Reciprocal Relationship Between the Rule of Law and Civil Society, 2015 Acta
Juridica 374, 384–90.

17.

See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 1–2 (1965) (“[I]t is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest follows
logically from the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. . . . Indeed, unless the number of
individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make
individuals act in their common interest, rational . . . individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interests.”).

18.

See Stu Woolman, Freedom of Association, in 3 Constitutional Law of South Africa 44-1, 44-9–
44-30 (Stu Woolman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).

19.

Tshepo Madlingozi has explained, in part, why the solidarity that held together the anti-apartheid
movement quickly evaporated after 1994. See Tshepo Madlingozi, Post-Apartheid Social Movements and
the Quest for the Elusive ‘New’ South Africa, 34 J.L. & Soc’y 77, 80–88 (2007). Madlingozi demonstrates
that despite the solidarity and the victory of the ANC and other groups that had cooperated within the
United Democratic Front, the ANC, once in power, moved away from mass participatory democracy.
Indeed, the ANC’s politics serve a new elite and consciously strive to demobilize popular organizations
that may oppose ANC policies. Id.

20. What are some of the most prominent features of that rough terrain? South Africa, circa 2015, had:

(i) a one-party-dominant democracy undermined by clientelism, cronyism, and corruption, see
Choudhry, supra note 1, at 7–8, 22–24, 32–33 (2009); (ii) an official unemployment rate of 25.5% (this
figure discounts persons who never sought or have stopped seeking employment, thus a real rate of
34.4%), see South Africa Unemployment Rate, Trading Econ., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
south-africa/unemployment-rate (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); (iii) a meager growth rate that has fluctuated
between 1.3%, negative 1.3%, and 0.7% over the first three quarters of 2015, see Economic Growth, Stat.
S. Afr., http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=735&id=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); (iv) one of the
highest Gini coefficients in the world, see Income Inequality and Limitations of the Gini Index: The Case of
South Africa, Hum. Sci. Res. Council, http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/review/hsrc-review-november-2014/
limitations-of-gini-index (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); (v) a population in which one in three black women
has HIV and up to 55% regularly experience intimate partner violence, see Stu Woolman et al., Nowhere
To Run, Nowhere to Hide: The Absence of Public Policy as to How Health Professionals Should Address Intimate
Partner Violence Abrogates the Rights to Healthcare and Bodily Integrity Under the South African Constitution,
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II.	THE BASIC LAW AS SCAFFOLDING

The Selfless Constitution engaged problems of change in a manner designed to
realize the lofty goals to which the Constitution aspires. That work demonstrated
that individuals, associations, and a constitutional democratic order are best placed
to make constructive changes when (a) they are understood as radically heterogeneous,
naturally and socially determined entities; and (b) they, so understood, can overcome
extant constraints through trial and error, decent feedback, and the provision of the
material conditions and the immaterial conditions necessary for individuals to pursue
lives worth valuing.
This short intervention has a decidedly different aim. Consistent with Jurgen
Habermas’s prescient analysis of the difficulties of establishing successful constitutional
democracies, 21 this article suggests that we employ a more modest metric for the
evaluation of new constitutional democracies: the basic law as scaffolding.
Almost all newly minted constitutional democracies suffer from (a) a thin civil
society that makes a robust rule of law culture difficult to vouchsafe; (b) a lack of
political accountability; and (c) weak administrative organs of state capable of
delivering essential goods. 22 The “scaffolding” thesis requires that those three
pathologies be cured before an aspirational constitutional party gets started.
22 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 29 (2016); (vi) an educational system that ranks near the very bottom of
developing countries, see generally Brahm Fleisch, Primary Education in Crisis: Why South
African Schoolchildren Underachieve in Reading and Mathematics; South Africa’s Education
System vs the World, BusinessTech (May 14, 2015), http://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/87310/
south-africas-education-system-vs-the-world/, and in which only 15% of university students graduate,
see Nontobeko Mtshali, Only 15% of SA University Students Graduate, Iol (June 13, 2013, 11:20 AM),
http://www.iol.co.za/lifestyle/family/kids/only-15-of-sa-university-students-graduate-1.1531809.
Compare South Africa to two European democracies. Spain only arose out of the shadows of Franco’s
dictatorship forty years ago. See Francisco Franco, History.com, http://www.history.com/topics/
francisco-franco (last visited Apr. 9, 2016). Greece, after toppling a military junta in 1974, actually held
a referendum as to whether it should be governed as a monarchy or a democracy. See Nikos Chrysoloras
& Paul Tugwell, What Will Greeks Vote On? The Referendum Question, BloombergBusiness (June 27,
2015, 10:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-27/what-will-greeks-vote-onthe-referendum-question-ibexrhf0. The deep depressions in both of these European democracies are a
function of the limited time available to create a civil society governed by the rule of law, political
accountability, and strong bureaucracies capable of weathering such storms as the 2008 global meltdown.
And what of the European Union? See generally Europe’s Justice Deficit? (Dimitry Kochenov et al.
eds., 2015). The draft European Constitution for a twenty-member federation flopped—after just two
“No” referenda results. See Dutch Say ‘Devastating No’ to EU Constitution, The Guardian (June 2, 2005,
6:32 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/02/eu.politics.
21.

Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy 2–3 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
The development of constitutional democracy along the celebrated “North Atlantic”
path has certainly provided us with results worth preserving, but once those who do not
have the good fortune to be the heirs of the Founding Fathers turn to their own
traditions, they cannot find criteria and reasons that would allow them to distinguish
what is worth preserving from what should be rejected.

Id. While academics the world over were having a democracy and human rights parade, Habermas
predicted what actually transpired here, there, and everywhere over the next two decades. Few listened.
22. See Marc F. Plattner, Is Democracy in Decline?, 26 J. Democracy 1, 7–10 (2015).
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A. Constitutions as Peace Treaties, Interim Social Contracts, and Scaffolding

The South African Constitution is best understood as a peace treaty and an
initial stab at a social contract. It begs credulity to believe that a peace treaty and an
initial stab at a social contract can deliver substantially more than a basic law as
scaffolding.
“The real story” behind the Constitution provides a partial explanation. Superelite “white” capital finally found South Africa ungovernable in the 1980s—as the
United Democratic Front had successfully planned. The treaty-making talks between
the super-elites who wished to have capital controls lifted and the ANC’s broadbased coalition who wished to see apartheid buried allowed those elites to take their
capital elsewhere. In return, the ANC secured the levers of political power. Thirty
years on, against the background of global events (the severe economic contraction of
South Africa’s major trading partners) and domestic miscues and malfeasance (the
adoption by the ANC of a patrimonial approach to governance), the old deal that
delivered the Constitution has frayed considerably.
Yet the old deal delivered a number of important items. First, it gave South
Africa a peaceful transition of political power. That’s no small thing when you
consider the number of nation-states that have fallen apart in the last twenty years as
they embarked upon the conversion from authoritarian rule to democratic regimes.
Second, it provided the platform upon which to erect a still viable political order.
The most critical and creative piece of institutional design at the Multi-Party
Negotiating Forum took the form of thirty-four Constitutional Principles (CPs) in
the Interim Constitution.23 The purpose of these principles was to place meaningful
constraints on the ANC’s ability to draft the final Constitution entirely to its liking
in return for equally meaningful constraints on the National Party’s (NP) ability to
refuse to engage, or to hold out for better terms. In exchange for these constraints on
the scaffolding, the ANC and the NP were placated by three distinct processes.
First, the Interim Constitution would go into effect after the first multi-racial
elections, and parties would be proportionally represented in Parliament.24 Second,
the newly elected representatives in both Houses of Parliament would sit as a
Constitutional Assembly and be required to produce the text of a final Constitution
within two years. 25 Third, an independent Constitutional Court would have the
power to ensure that the final Constitution (“New Text”) satisfied the CPs. 26 This
extraordinary piece of lawmaking helps us better understand South Africa’s peaceful
transition on April 27, 1994.
The Constitutional Assembly discharged its responsibilities in May 1996. It
remained for the Constitutional Court to assess the New Text’s compliance with the
CPs. The Court held, in the First Certification Judgment, that the Constitutional
23. See S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, sched. 4.
24.

Id. §§ 40, 48, 88.

25.

Id. § 73.

26. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at paras. 1–23, 31.
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Assembly’s New Text failed to comply with the CPs.27 It did so on extremely limited
grounds.28
Several grounds for refusal fit snugly into the thesis that the primary purpose of
South Africa’s Constitution is scaffolding. The Court held that the CPs required
special procedures (in addition to special majorities) for certain forms of constitutional
amendments;29 ensured that the process of removing (through special majorities) the
Public Protector and the Auditor-General guaranteed genuine independence of these
Chapter 9 institutions;30 demanded that the new Constitution specify the measures
by which the Public Service Commission (PSC) would remain independent and
impartial,31 and declared that no act could be declared beyond judicial review (unless
it was made part of the constitutional text itself).32
The Constitutional Court, far from dictating the future political, social, and
economic terrain in any meaningful sense, created the conditions for a robust form of
self-governance heretofore unknown in South Africa. The Court’s insistence on
special procedures for (a) amendments to the Bill of Rights (with its clear commitment
to subjecting private power as well as public power to its dictates) or (b) removal of
the Public Protector and the Auditor-General meant that the new state would ensure
that those who govern are subject to the same strictures as those who are governed
and to a degree of accountability beyond the intermittent exercise of the franchise by
the electorate. The First Certification Judgment concerns itself with the first two
lineaments of the basic law as scaffolding. The third and most unheralded component,
the creation of effective administrative organs of state that would serve all South
Africans equally, lay beyond its immediate purview.
B. Scaffolding and Our Commitment to the Rule of Law

Michael Walzer conjures up what we all expect of any constitution meant to
initiate the creation of a just and well-ordered legal regime:
I want to begin my argument by recalling a picture ( . . . late in . . . 1989) . . . .
It is a picture of people marching in the streets of Prague; they carry signs,
some of which say, simply, ‘Truth’ and others ‘Justice.’ When I saw the
picture, I knew immediately what the signs meant – and so did everyone else
who saw the same picture. . . . Is there any recent . . . post-modernist account,
of . . . language that can explain this understanding and acknowledgement?
How could I . . . join so unreservedly in the language game or the power play

27.

See id. at paras. 482–84.

28. The Constitutional Court had no choice but to (a) reject the power of local government to impose excise

taxes; (b) find that Chapter 7’s provisions for local government powers were far too scanty; and (c)
conclude that the collective bargaining rights in section 23 of the New Text failed under CP XXVIII to
protect adequately the rights of individual employers. See id. at paras. 63–69, 299–330.

29. Id. at para. 156.
30. Id. at paras. 163, 165.
31.

Id. at paras. 273–78.

32.

Id. at para. 149.
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of a distant demonstration? The marchers shared a culture with which I was
largely unfamiliar; they were responding to an experience I had never had.
And yet, I could have walked comfortably in their midst. . . .
....
. . . . What they meant by the “justice” inscribed on their signs . . . was
simple enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, equal and impartial law
enforcement, the abolition of the privileges and prerogatives of the party
elite—common, garden variety justice.33

That’s exactly what motivated the Constitutional Court in First Certification
Judgment. The Court ratified virtually all of the Constitutional Assembly’s manifold
cracks at levelling a radically asymmetrical socioeconomic playing field. In addition,
it strengthened, ever so slightly, institutions and procedures designed so that all
denizens of South Africa might better cooperate with their compatriots and the
persons elected to govern them.
South African courts have found large numbers of statutory provisions,
regulations, and rules of common law and customary law unconstitutional.34 Many
of these laws hailed from the days of apartheid and colonial rule. Besides purging
apartheid and colonial-era law from the books, the Court has spent significant
energy in establishing a baseline for (coordinated) action to which everyone—public
officials and private actors alike—could adhere: the rule of law (or legality) doctrine.
This doctrine ensures that all state action (a) is authorized by law; (b) applies equally
to the governors and to the governed; (c) is neither arbitrary nor irrational; and (d)
draws its power from the Constitution itself. 35
While various commentators have explored the potential limitlessness of power
the rule of law doctrine vests in South Africa’s courts, 36 what concerns us here is its
connection to scaffolding. In short, the rule of law doctrine primarily concerns itself
with that old familiar Lockean nostrum that without law there can be no freedom.
For example, the Constitutional Court, in Democratic Alliance v. President of the
Republic of South Africa, further entrenched the rule of law doctrine when it concluded
33. Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad 1–2 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at paras. 95, 136 (finding male

primogeniture with respect to inheritance unconstitutional and inconsistent with the dignity and
equality rights of women); S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para. 151 (finding capital
punishment unconstitutional).

35.

See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n of S. Afr. 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at para. 39 (quoting Stanley A. De Smith et
al., Judicial Review of Administrative Action 14–15 (5th ed. 1995)).

36. See Frank I. Michelman, The Rule of Law, Legality and the Supremacy of the Constitution, in 1

Constitutional Law of South Africa, supra note 18, at 11-1; Alistair Price, The Content and
Justification of Rationality Review, in Is This Seat Taken? Conversations at the Bar, the Bench
and the Academy about the South African Constitution 37 (Stu Woolman & David Bilchitz
eds., 2012) [hereinafter Is This Seat Taken?]. But see Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary Sch.
v. Essay 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) at paras. 57–60 (placing negative duties on private actors with regard
to the right to a basic education, but distinguishing these duties from the more onerous positive and
negative obligations of public officials).
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that the President had acted irrationally in making a significant appointment required
by the Constitution.37 The Democratic Alliance Court placed substantial emphasis on
the need for the National Director of Public Prosecutions to be independent and
conduct her work—including assessments of the legality of actions taken by
government officials—without fear, favor, or prejudice.38
More recently, in South African Broadcasting Corporation v. Democratic Alliance,
the Supreme Court of Appeal found that coordinate branches of government and
various organs of state were obliged to take cognizance of adverse findings by the
Public Protector.39 The Public Protector had produced a detailed report that revealed
fraud, deception, and gross misconduct on the part of the SABC Board, its Chief
Operating Officer (COO), and the Minister of Communications.40 The duplicity of
the COO took place on such a grand scale that the Public Protector recommended
his removal—along with a number of other remedies.41 The Minister and the SABC
countered that such fraud had not occurred, proceeded to reinstate the COO, and
ignored the remainder of the Public Protector’s findings and recommendations.42
The Supreme Court of Appeal would have none of it. Indeed, it spent the better part
of its judgment recounting the COO’s duplicity and the blatant disregard for the law
by the Minister and the SABC Board.43 What truly galvanized the court was the
refusal by the Minister and an organ of state to recognize that the Public Protector
plays a critical role in maintaining the rule of law by standing guard over the
guardians.44 Sustained disregard for the findings of Chapter 9 institutions would
render their constitutionally-mandated role superf luous.45 An agitated Supreme
Court of Appeal held that the rule of law required that the Public Protector’s findings
and remedies must be viewed as binding, unless they are subsequently set aside on
review by a court of law.46
These cases stand for a number of rather modest propositions. First, both
appellate courts remain committed to the proposition that the Constitution represents
a signal break from the apartheid state’s culture of authority and the embrace of a
culture of justification. Second, the aspirations set out in the Constitution are only as
good as every citizen’s commitment to making good on their promise. As the
37.

2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at para. 86.

38. See id. at paras. 49, 56.
39. [2015] ZASCA 156 (SCA) at paras. 52–53.
40. Id. at para. 5.
41.

See id. at para. 7.

42.

See id. at paras. 9–11.

43.

See id. at paras. 6–21.

44. See id. at paras. 55–60.
45.

Id. at paras. 47, 56. Other Chapter 9 institutions of import created by the Constitution (in Chapter 9)
are the Auditor-General, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, and
the Independent Electoral Commission. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 181–94.

46. S. African Broad. Corp., [2015] ZASCA 156 at para. 53.
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Constitutional Court correctly noted in Shilubana v. Nwamitwa, the responsibility
for the delivery of those material and immaterial goods necessary for flourishing
rests most often with the citizens themselves and the associations, networks, and
communities that fundamentally shape their lives.47 However, since citizens rarely
enact new law via direct democracy, the transformation of South African society lies
almost entirely in the hands of elected officials and political appointees. To that end,
these representatives must establish the most rudimentary of commitments to the
rule of law. As it was in 1996, so it is in 2016.
Moreover, the courts’ appreciation for where genuine lawmaking and lawchanging occurs allows for an appreciable degree of self-correction by the parties
themselves. The Constitutional Court, in Residents of Joe Slovo Community v.
Thubelisha Homes (Joe Slovo II), reflected its commitment to this modest manifestation
of rule of law rulemaking when it agreed to discharge a previous order when the
parties subsequently arrived at a more desirable arrangement: “[I]t seems illogical for
this Court to have the power to vary an order issued on the basis that it was just and
equitable when changing circumstances require, but not to have the power to
discharge an order when the dictates of justice and equity require.”48
The Court does not abdicate its role in general norm-setting. Neither does it
close down the space for political participation that meaningful engagement orders
in cases like Joe Slovo II invite.49 That’s the basic law as scaffolding.
C. Scaffolding and Political Accountability

Do we possess evidence that the “basic law as scaffolding” thesis explains the
Court’s behavior in terms of political accountability? What if the First Certification
Judgment Court had allowed simple legislative majorities to dismiss the Public
Protector and the Auditor-General? The Public Protector and the Auditor-General
could hardly watch the watchers if they knew that any threat that they might pose to
members of the ruling party (or coalition) could result in their own ouster. The First
Certification Judgment Court put paid to this counterfactual. As we saw above in
South African Broadcasting Company v. Democratic Alliance, the Public Protector and
the Auditor-General have, through naming and shaming, done exactly what the
Constitutional Court had hoped that they would do.
D. Scaffolding and the Administration of the South African State

South Africa lacks, in palpable respects, the impersonal administrative state
developed two centuries ago in France and two millennia back in China.50 Yes, the
South African Revenue Service is an appropriately aggressive entity that collects the
necessary revenue for the discharge of the state’s many responsibilities. The Reserve
47.

See 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) at paras. 54–55.

48. Residents of Joe Slovo Cmty. v. Thubelisha Homes 2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC) at para. 24.
49. See id.
50. See Fukuyama, supra note 6, at 17.
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Bank and the Treasury have generally acted in a fiscally responsible manner. In
addition, the Constitution has enabled the national government to intervene when
provincial authorities have failed to discharge their duties.
Do we possess further evidence that the basic law provides scaffolding for the
administration of the state? In Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa, the
Constitutional Court concluded that without an independent, corruption-fighting
unit, the executive branch of government could not fulfill its duties under section
7(2) of the Constitution.51 Section 7(2) requires the state to promote, to protect, and
to respect the various substantive provisions found in the Bill of Rights.52 The
Glenister Court did not say how this unit would accomplish this task, only that, as
scaffolding, it would be well-placed to vouchsafe fundamental rights.
E. Constitutions Create the Space for Politics; They Do Not Replace Politics

Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s initial review of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act,53 Jack Balkin noted that a majority of American constitutional
law academics expected an extremely conservative bench to begin the process of
gutting it.54 That did not occur. As Balkin explained:
In civics class we learn that federal courts decide whether laws passed by
Congress and the state legislatures are constitutional. . . . That is certainly
true, but it [is] not the whole story. In fact, the most important function of
the federal courts is to legitimate state building by the political branches.
That is the best way to understand what happened in the Health Care Case.55

But Balkin wasn’t just fishing about (in 2012) to find anecdotal evidence in the
U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence to prop up his thesis. Just three years
later, in King v. Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Supreme
Court was afforded another opportunity to demolish the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.56 Again, the Supreme Court upheld the legislation.57 The U.S.
Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional Court recognize that they are
primarily guardians of the basic law and that the basic law’s scaffolding enables the
other branches of government and the citizenry to go about creating what they deem
to be a just and fair social order.
51.

2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at paras. 190, 194, 214.

52.

S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 7(2).

53.

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

54. See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, The

Atlantic (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-toon-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/.

55.

Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms Our Social Contract, The Atlantic (June 29, 2012), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/the-court-affirms-our-social-contract/259186/.

56. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
57.

Id.
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Etienne Mureinik captured the essence of the basic law as scaffolding argument
in his article “A Bridge to Where?”58 He is bumper sticker famous for his assertion
that South Africa’s Constitution reflects a commitment to supplanting a “culture of
authority” with “a culture of justification.”59 Twenty years later, we have a better idea
of what Mureinik had in mind. When courts, legislatures, and executive entities are
asked what lies behind their decisions, a rational justification will generally pass
constitutional muster.60 Because he consciously limited his conception of judicial
review to a mere reasonableness threshold, Mureinik is likewise lauded for allaying
fears associated with the potential of unelected justices, or those not carefully chosen,
to wreak havoc with a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) designed
to realize such rights.61 How do these contributions support the notion of constitutions
as “scaffolding”? First, by limiting their incursion into the political domain, Mureinik
managed to secure the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the Constitution. 62
Second, Mureinik believed that the ultimate responsibility for realizing a just
distribution of public goods lay with fifty million other South Africans and their
representatives—not the bench.63
III.	POLITICS THROUGH SCAFFOLDING OR REVOLUTION

South Africans officially buried apartheid a mere twenty years ago. Yet apartheid
was immensely successful on its own terms. South Africans live together, but apart.
While most daily interpersonal interactions are carried out in a dignified manner, all
such engagements carry an ethical charge: what one might call the moral salience of
everyday life. To be ever conscious of the imperative to treat others with dignity,
while remaining cognizant of living on a large plantation, is truly exhausting.
The next step requires even more of South Africans. The logic of collective
action often hinders groups of different sizes and kinds from delivering the public
goods that individuals and associations require in order to flourish.64 Whether that
occurs through the crooked timber of South Africa’s current democratic order, or by
revolution, is a question beyond the scope of this article.
58. Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 SAJHR 31 (1994).
59.

See id. at 32.

60. See Michael Bishop, Rationality is Dead! Long Live Rationality! Saving Rational Basis Review, in Is This

Seat Taken?, supra note 36, at 4–5. Only twice in twenty years has the Constitutional Court found
that the state failed to meet the requirements of rationality review. Id. at 5 n.22 (citing Van der Merwe
v. Rd. Accident Fund 2006 (4) SA 230 (CC) at para. 42; S v. Ntuli 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC)).

61.

See Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 SAJHR 464,
466–72 (1992).

62. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 26–29 (including housing; health care, water, food, and social security;

children’s rights; and education).

63. See Mureinik, supra note 61, at 465–66.
64. On that next step, see Stu Woolman, South Africa’s Aspirational Constitution and Our Problems of

Collective Action, 32 SAJHR (forthcoming 2016).
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